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IS THE ATO A LAW UNTO ITSELF?' 
ROBIN WOELLNER* 
I BACKGROUND 
Over recent years, tax advisers and others have complained that the Australian Taxation 
Office on occasions issues rulings, determinations, media releases and, indeed, 
assessments inconsistent with single judge decisions in the Federal Court with which the 
ATO does not agree. 
The 2002 decision in Essenbourne v Commissioner of Taxation (Commonwealthi is 
often cited as a clear example of this phenomenon. The issues in Essenbourne were 
whether: 
(i) the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction for payment made to a superannuation 
fund in respect of an employee share plan, and 
(ii) the payment created a taxable fringe benefit3 . 
Kiefel J held that the relevant expenditure was not incurred in gaining or producing 
assessable income or necessarily incurred in carrying on a business, was capital in nature 
(so that it was not deductible in any event), and in addition, in his view would be caught 
by Part IVA. 
In relation to FBT, her Honour held that there could only be a taxable fringe benefit 
where the ATO was able to identify a particular employee to whom the benefit was 
provided, rather than simply identifY a general benefit provided to employees at large, 
1 I wish to thank Professor Stephen Graw for his perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this Paper. 
* Professor Robin Woellner , Pro Vice Chancellor for Law, Business and the Creative Arts at James Cook 
University. 
" 2002 ATC 5210, (Kiefel J, Fed Ct). 
3 Above, 5214. 
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and it was this fringe benefits tax issue which indirectly led to the subsequent issues 
addressed below. 
The ATO made it clear that it did not accept Kiefel J's decision as being correct4. This 
view was consistent with the ATO's prior practice, as it had indicated in Taxation Ruling 
TR 1999/5 that it would apply the "general benefit" views, and would take the 
opportunity to test the point in future cases - which it subsequently did in Essenbourne 6. 
The Commissioner subsequently issued a Media Release indicating that he would not 
appeal the decision in Essenbourne: because the Court had held that the payment to the 
fund was not deductible, so that the A TO had therefore "won" the case on this point, and 
as a result there was no basis on which the ATO could appeal from Kiefel J's decision on 
the FBT point (Edmonds J in the Full Court had expressed doubt on the ATO's argument 
on this point). The ATO announced, however, that it did not agree with Kiefel J's 
reasoning on FBT, and would in future apply the "general benefit" interpretation to 
disallow objections raising this issue. 
It was unfortunate that the FBT point was not taken to the Full Court (perhaps through 
the Test Case programme), as this would have avoided five years of uncertainty and the 
risk of having the ATO continuing to issue incorrect assessments to taxpayers over that 
period. 
Subsequently, the ATO argued the FBT point - unsuccessfully - in a series of decisions 
given by the AAT and single judges of the Federal Coure, all in effect rejecting the 
ATO's view on the fringe benefit point: see Benstead Services Pty Ltd v Fe ofTS (AAT), 
4 Commissioner of Taxation speech 14 March 2003, and Media Release of the same date. 
5 Robertson above, 638. 
6 Taxation Ruling TR 1999/5, paras 45-49. 
7 Variously viewing Essenhourne as "clearly correct", "not clearly wrong", or following it because of 
judicial comity. 
8 2006 A TC 2511,2521 (PE Hack, PM McDermott RFD, RG Kenny AA T), where the A TO actually 
accepted that the AA T was bound to apply the Essenhourne approach. 
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and the single judge Federal Court decisions in Walstern v FC of Y; Spotlight Stores Pty 
Ltd v FC ofTIO ; Caelli Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd v FC ofTll; and Cameron Brae v FC 
of Tl2. 
Having subsequently failed to take the opportunity to seek a resolution of the issue by the 
Full Federal Court in Pridecraftl3, the ATO sought to test the point directly in FC of Tv 
Indooroopilly Children Services (Qld) Pty Lti4. 
II THE DECISION IN INDOOROOPILLY 
In Indooroopilly, the basic facts were that in an attempt to attract and retain staff for its 
child-care centres, ABC Learning Centres Ltd ("ABC Public") wished to set up an 
employee share scheme. Under the scheme, ABC Public would gift a number of its 
shares to a discretionary trust, in which the potential class of beneficiaries was limited to 
employees of a series of Regional Management Companies ("RMC"s) which had been 
licensed by a subsidiary of ABC Public to operate the child-care centres. Indooroopilly 
was one ofthese RMCs. 
ABC Public sought a private ATO ruling on whether the issue of ABC Public shares 
generated a fringe benefit in relation to either ABC Public or any of the RMCs. The 
9 2003 ATC 5076 (Hill J Fed Ct), 
10 2004 ATC 4674,4704 (Merkel J Fed Ct), indicating that the earlier decisions were not clearly wrong, 
and he would therefore follow them: see Robertson M CA disregard of the law - Commissioner of 
Taxation v Indooroopilly Children Services (Qld) Pty Ltd" 2007 TIA (41, 11),635,636) - and below on 
the subsequent 2005 appeal to the Full Federal Court under the name of Pridecraft. 
11 2005 ATC 4938,4950-51 (Kenny J Fed Ct) - distinguishing Essenbourne on the facts, but "assuming as I 
do that Essenbourne correctly states law on this point". 
11 2006 ATC 4433 (Ryan J, Fed Ct). 
13 On appeal to the Full Federal Court [Pridecraft Pty Ltd v Fe ofT; Spotlight Stores Pty Ltd 2005 ATC 
400 I], the ATO's submission was expressly worded so that the Full Federal Court was asked to decide the 
FBT issue only if the payments in question were found to be deductible. As the payments were in fact held 
non-deductible, the Court accordingly declined to rule on the FBT point. It is not clear why the A TO did 
not take the opportunity to have the point clarified by the Full Court, particularly as it kept the sec 5 J and 
Part IV A points "alive" as alternative points for decision. 
14 2007 ATC 4236 (Full Fed Ct - Stone, Allsop, Edmonds JJ). See further Bender P, "Indooroopilly - the 
Tax Office cringes at the fringe", (2007) 10 CCH Tax Week, I. 
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ATO ruled that the issue of shares create a fringe benefit in respect of the RMCs, but not 
in relation to ABC Public. On appeal by ABC Public, the Full Federal Court held that the 
ATO's interpretation was wrong, and that as indicated by the previous line of cases, there 
was no fringe benefit created because the shares gifted to the discretionary trust were not 
provided in respect of particular employees. 
The Commissioner subsequently indicated that the ATO would not seek special leave to 
appeal the FBT point to the High Court, and henceforth would apply the law as 
confirmed by the Full Federal Court. This was perhaps surprising - having held the line 
on its view for some five years in the face of a sequence of decisions by single Federal 
Court justices, one might have expected the ATO to push for a determinative decision 
from the High Court. In the circumstances, the High Court might well have given serious 
consideration to an application for specialleave l5 . 
While the taxpayer's win in Indooroopilly on the substantive FBT point was important, 
the broader significance of the case arose from a number of critical comments from the 
members ofthe Full Federal Court on the ATO's conduct of the case. 
The genesis ofthese critical comments arose from submissions made by the ATO to the 
Court, in which the ATO had stated l6 that in light of decisions such 
as Business World Computers Pty Ltd v Australia Telecommunications Commission17: 
"8. The fact that there are single judge decisions on the meaning of the definition 
of 'fringe benefit' does not mean that the Commissioner was bound to follow 
those decisions as against taxpayers who are not privy to those decisions. 
9. There is no principle of estoppel that would bind the Commissioner to apply 
the single judge decisions to which the respondent was not a party, in relation to 
15 Despite the High Court's indication that normally a decision of the Full High Court will be determinative 
in taxation matters - see Woe liner Robin et aI, 17th edn (CCH Aust Ltd, Sydney, 2007), 1922-3. 
16 Quoted by Edmonds J, 2007 A TC 4255. 
17 1988] 82 ALR 499,504. 
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the application of the FBT Act to the arrangement the subject of the respondents 
ruling request,,18. 
This stark formulation provoked an interesting exchange between Bench and Counsel. 
Edmonds J observedl9 that when challenged from the Bench that 
"a proposition such that the Commissioner does not have to obey the law as 
declared by the courts until he gets a decision that he likes was astonishing", 
Counsel for the Commissioner had indicated that these propositions had been put III 
response to the taxpayer's specific contentions (presumably, that the ATO was obliged to 
apply those decisions), and had not been intended to assert that in exercising statutory 
discretions the ATO was generally entitled to disregard judicial decisions contrary to the 
rule oflaw. Indeed, Counsel indicated that the ATO had issued its private ruling contrary 
to the prior single Justice decisions precisely in order to enable the Full Federal Court to 
reconsider those decisions and thus determine the correct legal principle :20. 
Edmonds J. suggested that in making the ruling in Indooroopilly, the ATO was required 
either to apply the principle established in the earlier single judge decisions or to else 
seek a declaration from the Federal Court on the law to be applied21 . 
Allsop J was also very critical of the ATO, and given the tenor of his comments, it is 
appropriate to reproduce them at some length22 . Allsop J stated that: 
18 D Bennett QC, H Burmester QC and J Hmelnitsky, "Application of Precedent to Tax Cases - Further 
Opinion on Declaratory Proceedings" (18 June 2007),4,23 - advice to ATO on relevant aspects of the 
judgment ofthe Full Federal Court in lndooroopi/ly.- at 23 state that the ATO is not required to follow a 
single instance judicial decision where "there are good arguments that, as a matter of law, that decision is 
incorrect" - in which case "an early test case is the appropriate procedure". 
19 2007 A TC 4255 
10 Indeed, th~ Coml~lissioner subsequently indicated informally that this had been the consistent A TO 
practice for some time, and that in his view, without such an approach, the opportunity for the High Court 
to determine key principles established on appeal in seminal cases such as Curran and Slutzkin would never 
have arisen. 
11 2007 A TC 4256 
11 Edmonds .i endo;sed the comments made by Allsop J on this issue. 
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"3. . .. From the material that was put to the Full Court ... taxpayers appeared to 
be in the position of seeing a superior court of record in the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction declaring the meaning and proper content of a law of the Parliament, 
but the executive branch of the government, in the form of the Australian 
Taxation Office, administering the statute in a manner contrary to the meaning 
and content as declared by the Court; that is, seeing the executive branch of 
government ignoring the views of the judicial branch of government in the 
administration of a law of the Parliament by the former. This should not have 
occurred. If the [ATO] has the view that the courts have misunderstood the 
meaning of a statute, steps can be taken to vindicate the perceived correct 
interpretation on appeal or by prompt institution of other proceedings, or the 
executive can seek to move the legislative branch of government to change the 
~o 
statute ..... ".--'. 
His Honour indicated that "considered" determinations of a court which determine the 
meaning of a statute "are not to be ignored by the executive as inter partes rulings 
binding only in the earlier lis . ... 24. He was also highly critical of "some inferential 
suggestion in argument" by the ATO that it was "somehow" required by unidentified 
legislation to administer the legislation in accordance with its "own view of the law and 
the meaning of statutory provisions, rather than by following what the courts have 
declared,,25. 
13 Allsop J quoting Marshall CJ in Marbury v Madison 5 US 87, at 111(1803). 
14 Allsop J referring to the comments by Mahoney J. in P & C Cantarella v Egg Marketing Board [1973]2 
NSWLR 366, 383. 
15 2007 ATC, 4239. The ATO's oblique reference was perhaps to s 359-(5)(1) which Section 359-5(1) 
[read with s359-35 (1)-(3)] TAA provides that on application, unless a specified exception applies, the 
Commissioner must "make a written ruling on the way in which the Commissioner considers a relevant 
provision applies or would apply to you in relation to a specified scheme ... ". A private ruling is a 
"taxation decision", and a dissatisfied taxpayer may object to it: s 359-60(1). (2). 
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This was a remarkable judicial attack on the administration of the tax system by the 
AT026, and raises a number of significant issues which are discussed below. 
III REACTIONS To INDOOROOPILLY 
The ATO issued a subsequent Impact Statement, indicating that it would seek advice 
from the Solicitor-General on the questions of the application of precedent and the 
possibility of obtaining an advisory opinion - this advice was received subsequently27 
and is discussed below. 
In the meantime, not surprisingly, the comments by the Full Federal Court III 
Indooroopilly generated some opposite but vigorous reactions from commentators. 
At one extreme, Mark Robertson argues that the ATO's approach in Indooroopilly 
amounts to a breach of the rule of law and the boundary between the proper roles of the 
executive and judiciary (offending the separation of powers doctrine). Robertson's thesis 
is that, in its excessive zeal to protect the revenue, the ATO has objectified and 
demonised28 "tax promoters" or "aggressive tax planners", as "enemies of the State" -
thus justifying any action against them, even if in breach of the rule of law29 and even 
though no illegal conduct may be involved30. 
16 Perhaps significantly, in a speech delivered after the Full Federal Court's decision in indooroopilly, the 
Commissioner confirmed the ATO's role as an "administrator" of the law rather than a policy or law 
maker: M 0' Ascenzo, "Creating the right environment: transparency, cooperation and certainty in tax", 
Speech to the Financial Executives International of Australia, Intercontinental Hotel, Sydney (19 June 
2007). 
17 Bennett, Burmester and Hmelnitsky, above. 
18 Robertson draws on the work of Anne Applebaum (in Gulag: A History, Penguin 2003) and employs an 
analogy to Russia under Joseph Stalin, where people were disenfranchised by being characterised as 
"enemies of the people", "wreckers" or "saboteurs" deemed dangerous to the State, and therefore stripped 
of ordinary legal and other rights. Robertson argues that the terms "tax promoter" and "aggressive tax 
planning" are used by the A TO today in a similar pejorative and dehumanizing way: Robertson above, 635. 
19 Above, 636. 
30 Above, 635, referring also to Applebaum's citation of Hannah Arendt, above, 21. Robertson warns that a 
well-intentioned creation of an "objective enemy" may be even more dangerous than one created with 
malign intent. 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - AL TA 
2007 Refereed Conference Papers 
In support of his argument, Robertson refers to cases such as Benstead Services Pty Ltd v 
FC of Til. His argument also obtains some support from comments made by the 
Inspector-General of Taxation. In his Report on The Review of Tax Office Management 
on Part IVC Litigation32, the Inspector-General of Taxation concluded (among other 
things) that: 
1. The A TO sees litigation as a means of validating its interpretation of legislation 
and ensuring that taxpayers comply with its view of the law, rather than as a 
means of clarifying the meaning of the law, so that "community perceptions that, 
at times, the Tax Office has a 'win at all costs' approach to litigation are justified" 
,33. and 
, 
2. In his view, the ATO action in departing from decisions of a court or tribunal in 
similar cases where the ATO believes this is necessary in order to protect the 
Parliamentary intent, "provide a basis for the perception that the Tax Office is 
prepared to act, and in some cases has acted, outside the rule oflaw,,34. 
Similarly, Nicols and Peadon suggest that the ATO settled several test programme cases 
that would have further clarified the meaning of the key Part IVA ITAA 36 general anti-
avoidance provisions because the ATO was advised the cases were unlikely to support its 
• • 1'1 
mterpretatlOn- -. 
These comments may suggest that, in the heat of battle, officers of the ATO can 
sometimes forget that as an agency of the Federal government, the ATO "has no private 
or self-interest of its own separate from the public interest it is constitutionally bound to 
31 2006 ATC 2511,2521 (PE Hack SC, PM McDermott RFD and RG Kenny (AAT). ". 
31 Australia, Treasury David Vos, Cth of Aust (7 August 2006). 
33 Key Finding 4.1; Key finding 4.2. 
34 Key Findings 4.4; see the vigorous exchange of views in KF 4.6 [A.3c.27-34]. 
35 The A TO apparently advised the Inspector-General that it did so because it wanted to "ensure that no 
case detracted from the favourable High Court decision in FCT v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216": Nicols P and 
Peadon C, "Is the Tax Office turning over a new leaf in its approach to dispute resolution?", Aliens Arthur 
Robinson ("AAR"), 2007 Focus - Tax, www.aar.COI11.au, (accessed 30 August 2007) 3 - citing their June 
2007 AAR note on "]nspector-General's report raises concerns/or all taxpayers". 
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serve,,36, and that the public interest role of the ATO is simply to ensure that taxpayers 
are assessed on the correct amount oftax under the existing law. 
In contrast to these views, the Hon Daryl Davies QC took quite a different approach to 
the two key issues raised by the comments of the Full Federal Court in Indooroopilli7. 
3.1 The question of the availability of declaratory orders: Davies argues that the 
suggestions by Allsop and Edmonds JJ in Indooroopilly, of alternative approaches was 
misconceived. Their Honours had suggested that a preferable course of action for the 
Commissioner in Indooroopilly would have been for him either to seek a legislative 
amendment or a declaratory ruling from the Federal Court. Looking at each in tum: 
On the question of legislative change, Davies notes that legislative time in Federal 
Parliament is scarce and that it is hard to get amendments into the legislative programme 
and then passed into law. 
This certainly seems often to be the case - though the ATO appears able to push 
legislation through very quickly when it deems it necessary. Moreover, it is difficult to 
accept - once it appeared that the opportunity to test the point in court was likely to be 
delayed significantly - that the ATO could not have sought legislative clarification at 
some time during the intervening years. 
On the question of whether the ATO could have sought declaratory orders from the 
Federal Court, Davies' response is that the Federal Court has no power to make 
declaratory orders on the meaning of taxation legislation in circumstances such as those 
in Indooroopilly. 
36 Lee Steven (Assistant Victorian Government Solicitor) "The State as Model Litigant", September 2006 
Victorian Government Solicitor's Office, Lunchtime Seminar Series, 3, quoting Justice Finn in the Hughes 
Aircraft case (albeit in a different context). 
37 Davies, Hon Daryl QC 'The relationship between the Commissioner of Taxation and the Judiciary", 
2007TIA(41,11),630. 
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It is certainly well-established that under the Commonwealth Constitution, Federal 
Courts exercising judicial power generally can only determine a question oflaw when the 
issue affects parties' rights or liabilities in relation to a "matter,,38, and cannot generally 
provide declaratory opinions39 . 
In this context, it was unfortunate that Edmonds J in Indooroopilly did not specifY the 
source of power he had in mind for the Federal Court's declaratory orders he referred 
to.40 However, two possible sources of such a power could be: 
(1) s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), which provides, so far as relevant, 
that: 
"(1 A) The original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia ... includes 
jurisdiction in any matter: -
(c) arising under any laws made by the Parliament, other than [criminal 
matters]; and 
(2) s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1975 (Cth), which provides, so far as 
relevant, that on the direction of the Chief Justice: 
"(1) The Court may, in relation to a matter in which it has original jurisdiction, 
make binding declarations of right, whether or not any consequential relief 
is or could be claimed. 
(2) A suit41 is not open to objection on the ground that a declaratory order 
only is sought". 
Both provisions appear to give the Federal Court jurisdiction to make declarations of 
right in appropriate cases, and taxpayers have succeeded in obtaining declarations of right 
in some cases. The issue for consideration is whether Indooroopily was such a case. 
38 In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 267; Davies (above), 630-1: see L Zines, The High 
Court and the Constitution, (4th edn 1997) Butterworths; compare PH Lane Commentary on the Australian 
Constitution (2nd edn 1997), Law Book Co; Bennett, Burmester and Hmelnitsky (above) 9-10. 
39 Bennett, Burmeister and Hmelnitsky, above, 5-15. 
40 Interestingly, Edmonds J appeared (as Edmonds SC) for the taxpayer in Unisys (below) in an application 
for declaratory relief in relation to the interpretation of the ITAA J 936. 
41 Under s 4 ofthe Act, "suit" is defined (unless the contrary intention appears) to include "any action or 
original proceeding between parties". 
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Since both of the above provisions raise similar issues, it is proposed to examine only the 
position in relation to s 39B (lA) (c) in detail. 
Uninstructed by authority, one would think that at the ATO ruling stage, it could be 
argued that the required elements for a declaratory order could be met, i.e. that there was: 
• a "matter" (i.e. a "justiciable controversy") within the broad meaning discussed 
below. Certainly the decision on a private ruling application is not purely 
"hypothetical", because one would think there must be a real likelihood that the 
transaction will proceed, as otherwise the ATO would presumably decline to rule 
under s 359-35(2)(a) ofthe Taxation Administration Act; 
• there will arguably be a proper "contradictor" (normally the ATO), who will 
have an interest in putting a case contrary to that put forward by the taxpayer42 (or 
vice versa); and 
• the matter will be one "arising under" a federal law within the broad meaning of 
that term43 (since the TAA ruling provisions create enforceable legal rights in the 
taxpayer and obligations on the ATO). 
There have been a number of cases in the tax context44 where parties have sought 
declarations from the Federal Court on various taxation issues45 (indeed, in Bob Jane T-
Marts Pty Ltd v Fe of T, the ATO itself sought a declaration on the question of how to 
determine the sale value oflocally manufactured and imported tyres sold by retaiI46). 
41 Though Bennett, Burmester and Hmelnitsky at 15 suggest there may be no "contradictor" in the legal 
sense because taxpayers may be unwilling to take on the cost and/or inconvenience of challenging the 
ruling: surely a strange comment in light of the actual facts in lndooroopilly! 
43 Allsop, below. 
44 As Davies himself notes - above, 631. 
45 Davies, above, 631. See for example Marana Holdings 2004 A TC 4256 - where, as noted above, 
Edmonds SC appeared for the taxpayer. 
46 99 ATC 4437, 4451 (Finklestien J - Fed Ct). 
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IV THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE LAW FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY 
ORDERS IN INDOOROOPILLY: 
There does not seem to have been a decision directly on the point at Issue III 
Indooroopilly, though the decisions are suggestive. 
In terms of the elements of ss 39B (1) (c) and 21, the term "matter" is defined in very 
broad terms for the purposes of s 39B (1A/7 . Indeed, as Justice Allsop indicated in a 
Paper to the NSW Bar Association in 2003 (some four years before his decision in 
Indooroopilly), the "matter" which must be found is: 
" the justiciable controversy between the actors to it comprised of the 
substratum of facts and claims representing or amounting to the dispute or 
controversy between ... them. . .. It is the whole controversy in respect of which 
it is the function of the court to quell ... ,,48 
He goes on to note that there are "non-controversial matters" which are accepted as being 
within this federal jurisdiction49 , and that a "controversy may be evident between parties 
well before either party decides to go to court ... and that it may, at that point, bear a 
federal character"so. 
Despite the width of this definition, case-law suggests that there could be some difficulty 
in using these provisions in the taxation context to provide a "pure" declaratory order on 
47 "Matter" is defined in s 2 ofthe Act to include "any proceedings in a Court, whether between parties or 
not, and also any incidental proceedings in a cause or matter". "Cause" is then defined in the same section 
to include "any suit, and also includes criminal proceedings", while "suit" in turn is defined to include "any 
action or original proceeding between parties"; see the observations by Lindgren J in White Industries 
Australia Ltd & Anor v FC ofT 2007 A TC 4442, 4458. 
48 Justice James Allsop, "Federal Jurisdiction and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia", paper 
to the NSW Bar Association (Sydney - 21 October 2003), 10. 
49 Referring to Hedge. as Administrator o/Goldfields Medical Fund Inc [2002] FCA 1498 (orders re 
administrator's proposed course of action); and generally Petrotimor Compaanhia de Petroleos S.A.R.L. v 
Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FCAFC 3, 83. 
50 Above, 14. 
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questions of interpretation of tax law for ruling purposes. Indeed, following the passage 
in his Paper quoted above, Justice Allsop added the caveat that the "best known 
limitation [on s 39(lA)(c)] is that it does not include advisory opinions ... [because] the 
Constitutional purpose of courts exercising ... the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
... to quell controversies, not to answer hypothetical questions or questions for advice put 
to them whether by private parties, the Parliament or the Executive ... ,,51. 
This observation is interesting, in light of his Honour's unqualified statement in 
Indooroopill/2 that he had "had the considerable advantage of reading the reasons" of 
Edmonds J, and agreed with them. Of course, his Honour may have had a different 
source of power in mind (technically Edmonds J's "reasons" for decision did not include 
his observations on declaratory relief), and Allsop J did not include declaratory relief in 
the "remedies" he suggested the ATO might pursue to "vindicate the perceived correct 
interpretation" of a provision53 . Nevertheless, if his Honour had doubts about the 
application of the "hypothetical question" exception, one might have expected him to 
voice them in the context ofthe vigorous exchange of views in Indooroopilly. 
V TAXATION CASE-LAW ON SEC 39(1A) (C): 
There is an emergmg body of case-law on the availability of declaratory orders m 
taxation matters. 
A useful starting point is the decision in Marana Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor v Fe of r4, 
where the Commissioner and taxpayer agreed that it was appropriate for the Full Federal 
51 Above - see also at 17-20 where his Honour discusses the difference between "merely interpreting" a 
federal law, and a matter "arising under a federal law", by reference to Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 
367; LNC Industries v BMW Aust Ltd (1983) 151 CLR 575, and Ahehe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 
510. 
51 2007 ATC 4236,4238. 
53 Above, 2007 ATC 4238. 
54 2004 ATC 5068. 
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Court to give a declaratory order determining whether the sale of a certain strata-title unit 
was input taxed under s 40-65 of the CST legislation, and the court did in fact make 
declaratory orders (in favour ofthe Commissioner))) under ss 39B (lA)(c) and 2156 . 
Marana involved the type of issue on which the ATO might well be called upon to rule. 
However, it should be noted that the case arose in the context of reviewing the decision 
of Beaumont J at first instance, rather than as an application for a declaratory order "ab 
initio" . 
In Unisys Corporation Inc v FC of r'i7, the Commissioner had issued a notice requiring 
payment of withholding tax, penalties and interest on profits which the taxpayer claimed 
were made through a permanent establishment in the USA and were therefore exempted 
from liability to Australian tax under the relevant Double Tax Agreement. Gzell J made a 
declaratory order that that the USA premises in question did not constitute a permanent 
establishment as defined in the DT A, and therefore declined to set aside the 
Commissioner's notice. Interestingly, in Un isys , the declaratory relief was granted 
although no formal assessment as such had issued - though the taxpayer's liability had in 
a sense "crystallized". 
In Remuneration Planning Corporation Pty Ltd v FC of r 8 Gyles J declined to intervene 
under s 39B to pre-empt the ATO from enforcing Public Ruling TR 99/5. His Honour's 
reasons were that (i) the Ruling was of "general operation", (in that it was not directed to 
any particular person), (ii) it was "purely advisory" (in that it simply notified the public 
of the ATO's view on a tax issue) and thus did not affect rights or liabilities in the 
relevant sense, and (iii) it could not disadvantage the taxpayer, because under the Rulings 
system, the most the taxpayer could be required to pay was the proper amount of tax. 
552004 ATC 5068,5080 (Full FC: Dowsett, Hely and Conti JJ). 
56 See at first instance 2004 ATC 4256 (Beaumont J - Fed Ct). 
57 2002 ATC 5146 (Sup Ct NSW, Gzell J). As noted, Edmonds SC (with Mr. Harper) appeared for the 
taxpayer in Unisys! 
58 200 I A TC 4130 (Gyles J - Fed Ct). 
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Gyles J observed that: 
"The applicant's complaint ... is that tax officials are likely to act in accordance 
with the Ruling in exercise of their powers [which is likely and] may lead to 
clients of the applicant being assessed for tax upon the basis of the Ruling. There 
are, however, elaborate provisions for appeal against assessments pursuant to Pt 
IVC of the Administration Act, including a full merits review by the 
Administrative Appeals TribunaL.. [The] Federal Court does not have any 
general supervisory role over the Executive, nor any role to enforce statutes save 
when a proper justiciable controversy is brought before it by the proper 
parties ..... The contrast between public rulings and private rulings is instructive. 
Private rulings do affect individual taxpayers, and there is an appeal system."S9 
Gyles J's final comments are interesting, and might suggest that his Honour may have 
been more inclined to provide declaratory orders had the case involved a private ruling 
(as in Indooroopilly), despite the existence of an appeal system for such rulings. 
Of more direct relevance to the current context is the decision in Young v Fe of rD. 
There, the taxpayer applied (among other things) for a declaration under s 39B (lA) that 
the actions of the Commissioner in adopting and announcing a polic/ I on how the ATO 
proposed to treat equity-linked bonds were unlawful. In the Federal Court, Gyles J 
declined to exercise his discretion to grant the remedy sought62 because of the cumulative 
effect ofa number of factors: 
1. The mere fact that the taxpayer had to make a decision as to whether or not to 
accept the "settlement" option offered under the Policy was not "in any relevant 
sense" adverse to him, and he therefore had no standing to complain about 
59 2001 ATC 4130,4135 (Gyles J). 
60 2000 ATC 4133 (Fed Ct - Gyles J). 
61 In ATO Media Releases 99/21 (15/6/1999) and 99/84 (30/11/1999), together with a note on the ATO 
website: see 2000 ATC 4133, 4136 (Gyles J). 
62 2000 A TC, 4140 - though His Honour indicated that while it was "doubtful" that any of the 
Commissioner's arguments individually was sufficient to justify refusing the orders sought, their 
"combined effect" persuaded him. 
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possible breaches of law involved. The only person who could complain about 
possible breaches oflaw would be the Commonwealth Attorney-GeneraI63 . 
2. it was clear that the ATO's Policy was inflexible and that the ATO intended to 
apply it, so that the issue was not "hypothetical" in a technical sense. However, if 
relief was refused, the only result would be the issue of an assessment. In his 
Honour's view, although the issue of an assessment would create a debt due for 
which the Commonwealth could sue and commence "garnishee" proceedings, the 
"lack of any act to scrutinise is a factor against the grant of relief ... particularly 
... where the act in question, assessment, cannot for relevant purposes, be 
challenged otherwise than in accordance with Part IVC of the Taxation 
Administration Act .. . ,,64. His Honour noted that the "existence of other remedies 
has always been a powerful factor against the grant of relief of the kind envisaged 
by s 39B of the Judiciary Act ... ,,65; 
3. while ss 175 And 177 ITAA (the privative clauses channeling tax reviews and 
appeals through Part IVC TAA) do not apply to the period prior to the issue of an 
assessment, it would be anomalous to allow the taxpayer to argue before 
assessment issues which could not be argued after the assessment "when it is only 
the assessment which gives effect to the unlawfulness so far as the [taxpayer] is 
concemed,,66. 
63 Ibid - citing Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty 
Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247, 260-4. 
64 2000 ATC 4133,4140-41 (Gyles J), citing respectively Kenny J in Hammersly Iron Pty Ltd v National 
Competition Council (1999).164 CLR 203, 225-7 (hypothetically); and on the exclusive operation of Part 
IYC, DFC ofT v Richard Walter Pty Ltd 95 ATC 4067, Sunrise Auto Ltd v FC ofT95 ATC 4840, Golden 
City Car & Truck Centre Pty Ltd v DFC ofT 99 A TC 4131, and San Remo Macaroni Co Pty Ltd v FC ofT 
99 ATC 5138. Similarly, inBob Jane T-Marts Pty Ltd v FC ofT99 ATC 5100. 5102, the Full Court of 
Hill, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ observed that the first instance judgment "demonstrated" the 
inappropriateness of declaratory relief in such circumstances, because the parties had been left with no 
order biding upon them. 
65 2000 ATC 4140 
662000 A TC' 4141 . , . 
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Accordingly, "in all the circumstances", Gyles J concluded that if relief were granted, it 
would "intrude" into the assessment process, and a declaration "would either be a 
surrogate injunction (which is undesirable) or have no utility,,67. 
With respect, his Honour's analysis is not compelling, particularly in relation to 
precluding arguments at the pre-assessment stage because of ss 175 and 177, and his 
suggestion that an order would have no utility. On this approach, a taxpayer is placed in 
the unenviable position of having to wait for the issue of an arguably wrongful 
assessment, and then incur considerable and arguably unnecessary expense and 
inconvenience in pursuing the formal objection/appeal process - which in any event 
might not resolve the particular issue: as Essenbourne and Pridecraft attest. Thus, in 
circumstances such as those arising in Young (where the ATO announced its intention to 
apply a particular policy which would impact adversely on a taxpayer), the taxpayer 
might well find it "useful" to obtain a declaration on the correct legal position, and thus 
avoid expensive and possibly inconclusive litigation. 
Subsequently, the taxpayer in Haritopoulos Pty Ltd v DFC of T unsuccessfully sought 
declarations under s 39B (lA) of breaches of obligation by the ATO to provide particulars 
of penalties and injunctive relief to restrain the ATO from enforcing an assessment and 
penalties68. The case does not provide any particular new insights in this context. 
The taxpayer in White Industries Australia Ltd & Anor v FC of T fared much better -
albeit at a preliminary stage. There Lindgren J found that there was a "matter arising 
under a federal law" within the meaning of s 39(lA)(b) where the taxpayer had 
challenged the ATO's decision to seek access to certain accountant's papers which the 
taxpayer argued were "restricted source" or "non-source" documents protected by the 
ATO's informal guidelines. However, the proceedings were only preliminary in nature, 
67 Citing Neeta (Epping) Pty Ltd v Phillips (1974) 131 CLR 286, 307; 2000 ATC, 4141 - Gyles J ordered 
the taxpayer to pay the ATO's costs. 
68 2007 ATC 4365,4371-2 (Besanko J), 
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and again the dispute arose in the context of an appeal against ATO objection decisions, 
rather than a request for a purely advisory opinion ab initio. 
Most recently, the taxpayer in Bilborough v DFC of T also failed to obtain relief under s 
39(1), on the basis that the ATO was under no legislative duty to take particular steps in 
compromising tax debts69 • The situation with private rulings in Indooroopilly can be 
distinguished on this point, but the case offers little to support an argument for purely 
declaratory relief. 
VI CONCLUSION - Is DECLARATORY RELIEF AVAILABLE? 
Overall, the case-law to date gIves some support for an argument that "purely" 
declaratory relief on intended rulings may be obtained under s 39B(1A)(c), though there 
are a number of potential barriers to such relief. It would seem that there is an arguable 
case that in such circumstances: an order in relation to a proposed ruling on a future 
proposed course of conduct would not be "hypothetical"; that there could be a "matter 
arising under a federal law" where a taxpayer applies for a ruling; and that declaratory 
relief under s 39B(1A)(c) could in such circumstances provide practical relief and not 
lack "utility". 
On the other hand, there is a clear judicial reluctance to grant declaratory orders under s 
39B in the tax context, with the existence of the Part lve objection and appeal procedure 
is often seen as a barrier to such orders (Young). Accordingly, it would seem that a 
declaratory order will be the exception rather than the rule, and orders have been declined 
in relation to a Public Ruling (Remuneration Planning) and enforcement of a policy 
announcement (Young), though orders have been granted in relation to GST and double 
tax treaty provisions (Marana, Unisys), and there is an arguable case for orders in limited 
circumstances in relation to private rulings. 
69 2007 ATC 4552. 
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Interestingly, in their August 2007 advice to the ATO on the comments on declaratory 
orders by Edmonds J in Indooroopilly, Bennett, Burmester and Hmelnitsky, while 
supporting the ATO's approach, suggest that a federal court may provide a declaratory 
order in limited circumstances in the tax context. 
They argue that in appropriate circumstances, a court can make declaratory orders in 
relation to a matter that has not yet occurred, or a proposed scheme or transaction70; or to 
determine what course of conduct a person should adopt to avoid some legalliabilit/ I or 
determine legal rights such as beneficial ownership of propertyn. In their view, the 
Federal Court also "has undoubted jurisdiction to make a declaratory order" in a range of 
circumstances prior to the issue of an assessment, including in relation to a taxpayer's 
liability to income tax or GST73 , and if the taxpayer could demonstrate a good reason 
why the dispute should be resolved prior to ruling or assessment, the court "might be 
persuaded to continue with the matter,,74 - as noted below, avoidance of delay, expense 
ands uncertainty might constitute a "good reason" for an order. 
However, they argue that it will not be appropriate to make declaratory orders III an 
Indooroopilly situation because: 
(i). once the Commissioner has formed his "view" and made the ruling, his statutory 
task is complete and there is then no legal controversy remaining to found a 
70 Above, 11-12, citing Barwick CJ in The Commonwealth v Sterling Nicholas Duty Free Pty Limited 
(1971-1972) 126 CLR 297, 305 - see also paras 29-30. 
71 Above, II - citing Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank/or Foreign Trade Limited 
[1921]2 AC 438. 
71 Above, II - citing Sarkis v DFC ofT (2005) ATC 4205. 
73 Bennett, Burmester and Hmelnitsky, above, 16 - citing Platypus Leasing inc & ors v Commissioner 0/ 
Taxation 61 ATR 239, where McLellan CJ at CL in turn cited Oil Basins Ltd v The Cth and the 
Commissioner o/Taxation (1993) 178 CLR, 643, 652 ff; followed in TAB Ltd v Commissioner o/Taxation 
(2005) 59 ATR 430. 
74 And in their view, the parties' wish to determine the correct tax liability of a proposed transaction or 
conduct would constitute a justiciable controversy: above, 17 - citing Platypus Leasing, above. 
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declaratory orde/5. This argument has some merit, though presumably even if 
correct, an objection against the ruling would create a pre-assessment legal 
controversy; 
(ii). there may be no contradictor, in that taxpayers may be unwilling to take on the 
cost and/or inconvenience of challenging the ruling. This argument is a little 
puzzling in light of the actual facts in Indooroopilly 76; and 
(iii). review of rulings should be through the normal statutory Part lVC procedures of 
objection and appeal77 . As a general point this may be true, but pursuit of the Part 
lVC procedures can be lengthy, costly, and inconclusive (as Essenbourne and 
Pridecraft showed), and courts have permitted taxpayers to use s 39B procedures 
in a range of cases; 
Similarly, they argue that it will "usually be prudent" for the Commissioner not to seek a 
declaration until after issuing as assessment because (in addition to the factors above): 
(iv). "in the absence of some special reason" the specific objection and appeal; 
provisions in Part lVC should not be "displaced" by declaratory orders78 . It might 
be argued that the avoidance of considerable delay and expense might be seen as a 
"special reason" in some circumstances; and 
(v). A declaration would move the onus of proof to the Commissioner contrary to s 
14ZZ0 and 14ZZK TAA79 , and in any event might not resolve all issues between 
the taxpayer and Commissioner80. The first point should not be an insuperable 
75 Bennett, Burmester and Hmelnitsky, above, 13-14: though "no doubt there is a dispute in a vernacular 
sense because the taxpayer and the Commissioner have different views about the operation of the law". 
76 Above, 15 
77 Above, 16. 
78 Above, 17 - citing Bah Jane T-Marts Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 94 FCR 457. 
79 Above, 18. 
80 Above, 18-19 - citing Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ Savings Bank Limited (1994) 125 CLR 213. 
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barrier in pre-assessment situations, while the second is not unique to declarations 
( see above). 
Perhaps the question of whether declaratory orders are available on the interpretation of 
taxation legislation should be tested by the ATO directly, and then - if it is found that 
there is no present power to make such orders - the government could, if it deemed it 
appropriate, introduce specific legislation to provide the power8!. 
3.2. the precedent issue: In relation to the Court's criticism of the ATO's failure to 
follow decisions of single Federal Court judges, Davies argues that the Commissioner is 
not bound to "apply immediately every statement of law adumbrated by a judge or 
judges. A decision of a court binds the parties but it does not bind either of the parties in 
other litigation with other people". 
Accordingly, Davies argues that if the Commissioner is advised that a judicial decision 
may be wrong and should be tested before a Full Court, but believes it cannot appeal in 
the present case or otherwise have the issue raised in appropriate litigation, sometimes the 
only way to achieve this may be for the ATO to issue assessments contrary to the 
interpretation applied by the single judge decisions - as it did in IndooroopiUl2. 
Davies' views are interesting. Certainly, it is well established that a single judge of the 
Federal Court of Australia is bound by decisions of the Full Court, but not by decisions of 
other single Federal Court judges83 , though ordinarily a single judge will follow a 
81 Modelled perhaps on provisions such as s J 25 ofthe Patents Acts 1990 (Cth) - which permits a person 
wishing to exploit an invention to make an application for a non-infringement declaration. 
81 Above, 632,637. Compare Bennett et al (above) 3, 23, and especially 24 (para 70) - they support this 
view, provided the A TO "is open about its intentions" and as quickly as possible (i) "puts those affected on 
notice" that it considers the decision wrong and proposes not to follow/apply it, and (ii) proceeds to test the 
point (quoting the earlier 2005/2006 advice given to the ATO by the Solicitor-General and Chief General 
Counsel). 
83 Minister/or Immigration and Multicultural Alfclirs (MIMA) v Farahanipour [2000] FCA 609 (Carr J); 
Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1985) I FCR 172; Telstra Corporation Ltd v 
Treloar [2000] FCA 1170; Hill J in Walstern (above), quoted with apparent approval by Ryan J in 
Cameron Brae (above) 2006 ATC, 4454. 
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decision of a fellow single judge "unless convinced that the earlier judgment was wrong" 
84 
However, while Davies is correct on the technical stare decisis issue, Bennett, Burmester 
and Hmelnitsky, while generally supporting the ATO's approach, note that in the face of 
a series of decisions applying the same principle, "it will always be more difficult to 
justifY a private ruling that ignores those decisions even for the purposes of a test case, 
and legislative change may be necessary,,85. 
In addition, Davies' comments are arguably tangential to the point raised by Allsop and 
Edmonds JJ. It is extremely unlikely that all three eminent members of the Full Federal 
Court in Indooroopilly were unaware of the doctrine of precedent as it applies to a line of 
single Federal Court Justice decisions. The comments by Allsop and Edmonds JJ were 
directed rather to the issue of whether the ATO as part of the executive arm of 
government could simply choose not to apply a pronouncement of law by single Judges 
of the Federal Court until the Full Federal (or High) Court of Australia had ruled on it. 
Put so baldly, this would be a startling proposition, and the ATO would be unlikely to 
support the (il) logical corollary that citizens should be equally free to disregard such 
Federal Court decisions where the taxpayer receives considered advice that a decision is 
arguably wrong. 
Moreover, if the ATO seeks to challenge an established court decision, ,it should try to 
clarifY the law as quickly as possible, rather than waiting for what the ATO might see as 
84 Burchett J in La Macchia v Minister/or Primary Industries and Energy (1992) 110 ALR 20 1,204. 
Indeed, "while of the greatest persuasive authority" single High Court judges have been held not to bind a 
State Court of Appeal Bone v Commissioner o/Stamp Duties [1972]2 NSW LR 651,664 (Hope JA); 654 
(Jacobs P); Businessworld Computers Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 82 
ALR 499,504 (Fed Ct) Gummow J; cfAppleton Papers Inc v Tomasetti Paper Pty Ltd [1983]3 NSWLR 
208,219 (McClelland J); Perron Investments Pty Ltd v DFC ofT (1989) 90 ALR 1,34 (Hill J). 
85 Bennett, Burmester and Hmelnitsky, above, 23. 
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the "strongest" case to support its interpretation86 . Davies' argument therefore loses 
some force in relation to Indooroopilly in light of the fact that the ATO did not have the 
point tested by the Full Federal Court two years earlier, when it had the opportunity to do 
so in Pridecraft (above). An outsider might interpret this as indicating that the ATO had 
sought to pick and choose the most favourable facts (to it) on which to test its view. Such 
an approach would be inappropriate in light of the obligation on the ATO to act as a 
"model litigant" (discussed below). 
It should also be noted that by adhering to its unsupported view of the law - ultimately 
proven to be wrong - for several years, the A TO had exposed taxpayers during that period 
to the risk of wrongful assessments and penalties, and the ATO's approach probably also 
deterred a number of honest taxpayers and advisers from using what turned out to be a 
perfectly legitimate tax minimisation technique. 
A further issue raised by the decision in Indooroopilly is: 
VII HAs THE ATO MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ACTING As A "MODEL LITIGANT" 
IN RELATION ToINDOOROOPILLY AND OTHER CASES? 
Even if one were to accept the arguments offered by Davies and the ATO's advisers, the 
history of the Indooroopilly litigation does not show the ATO in a particularly flattering 
light - especially when the ATO regularly exhorts taxpayers and advisers to obey the 
spirit as well as the letter ofthe law. 
This issue is of considerable importance, because the appearance of fairness and 
transparency, and the confidence of taxpayers and advisers that the ATO is acting with 
integrity are - as the ATO has often acknowledged - essential to the encouragement of 
86 Bennett et aI, above, 2-3, 23, take a similar view. 
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voluntary compliance, which IS in tum essential to the effective operation of the tax 
system87. 
In any event, as an agency of the Federal Government, the ATO is required to act as a 
"Model Litigant", and some may feel that in cases such as Pridecraft and especially 
Indooroopilly its actions may fall short of the very high standards required of a Model 
Litigant. 
VIII THE REQUIREMENTS OF A MODEL LITIGANT 
The Model Litigant guidelines set out the requirements that governments and their 
agencies must observe in conducting litigation - they are in essence "best practice" 
requirements for public sector litigation.88 . 
The Model Litigant requirements for federal bodies are contained in the Legal Practice 
Guidelines on Values, Ethics and Conduct issued by the Commonwealth Attorney-
General in November 1995, under s 55ZF of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).89. 
The key requirements of a Model Litigant include requirements that the agency must: 
(1). act... fairly in handling claims and litigation brought for or against the 
Commonwealth or its agenclO; and in particular: 
(2) (a) deal with claims promptly and not cause unnecessary delay in the handling of 
claims and litigation ... ; 
(c) act consistently in the handling of claims and litigation91 ... ; 
(g) not rely upon technical defences unless the government's or agency's 
interests would be prejudiced by the failure to comply with a particular 
. 97 d reqUIrement -; an 
87 The A TO also clearly recognizes the crucial role played by tax advisers in mediating taxpayer conduct 
and maximizing voluntary compliance: see Woe liner et al (above), 2040-41. 
88 Lee, above, 3; see also the other cases cited by Lee (above), I, footnote I. 
89 The genesis and content of the Commonwealth and Victorian guidelines are discussed by Lee (above), in 
'The State as Model Litigant" - see the references he cites at 15-16; compare Townsend M, "Should the 
model litigant rules apply to responsible and referral authorities in planning disputes". 
90 Lee above, 9 - while he is writing in relation specifically to the Victorian guidelines, for present purposes 
they are essentially the same as the Commonwealth ones. 
91 Lee, above, 9. 
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(h) not undertake and pursue appeals unless the government or its agency 
(as the case may be) believes it has reasonable prospects for success or the 
appeal is otherwise justified in the public interest93 . 
Note 3 to the requirements indicates that a Model Litigant must act in relation to 
litigation "with complete propriety, fairly and in accordance with the highest professional 
standards ... ", while, Note 4 indicates that these obligations "may require more than 
merely acting honestly and in accordance with the law and court rules ... [and also go] 
beyond the requirement for lawyers to act in accordance with their ethical obligations". 
However, the guidelines do not prevent the Commonwealth and its agencies such as the 
ATO from "acting firmly and properly to protect their interests,,94. 
Overall, the Model Litigant requirements set "an extremely high bar to jump over,,95, 
particularly as a Model Litigant is expected to comply with the spirit as well as the letter 
of the obligations96 • 
As noted earlier, the Inspector-General of Taxation identified in his 2006 Report a 
number of areas in which he concluded that the ATO had (or there was at least a 
community perception that it had) failed to meet the requirements of a Model Litigant. 
The failings identified by the Inspector-General included the ATO: 
(i) using litigation to confirm its view ofthe law for compliance purposes, rather than 
to clarify the law; 
(ii) declining improperly to follow decisions of courts or tribunals and thus in some 
cases acting outside the rule oflaw; 
(iii) lacking objectivity in its approach to litigation; and 
(iv) "strong" - and not entirely unjustified - community perceptions that the ATO's 
approach and conduct were not consistent with the model litigant rules97 . 
91 Lee, above, I I. 
93 Lee, above, 11-12. 
94 Note 4 to the Guidelines. 
95 Lee, above, 9. 
96 Wong Tai Shing v Minister/or Immigration. Multicultural and Indigenous Affclirs [2002] FCA 1271 
(Wilcox J). 
97 Report of the Inspector-General of Taxation (Mr David Vos) on Review of Tax Office Management of 
Part IVC litigation (above), Key Findings 4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4,4.6,4.10,4.13. 
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The ATO vigorously disputed each ofthese findings. 98 
Flowing from these perceived "flaws" in A TO litigious processes, the Inspector-General 
recommended among other things that the ATO should develop a practice statement, 
preferably of the status of a Taxpayer's Charter, and publish in that statement its 
philosophy and approach to tax litigation, the Model Litigant requirements and the role of 
the Office of Legal Services Co-ordination in administering the guidelines99 . The ATO 
responded by publishing in June 2007 a Practice Statement on its approach to 
litigation 100. 
It should be noted that a problem with the Model Litigant Rules is that they are only 
enforceable by the Commonwealth Attorney-General, and not by a taxpayer lOI • While 
Lee suggests that other accountability mechanisms could include the Auditor General, 
Parliamentary questions, the Ombudsman and the media102, these avenues are unlikely to 
provide taxpayers with adequate solutions in many cases. 
It is submitted that, whatever the technical position in relation to precedent, declaratory 
orders and the like, the ATO should at all times act as a Model Litigant - even if at times 
this requires it to act in a way that does not fully exploit its technical position. 
IX CONCLUSION 
The issue is not the integrity of the Commissioner of Taxation or his officers - I hold the 
Commissioner and the senior officers I have met in the very highest regard. It is not even 
a question of whether or not ATO in fact operates as a "law unto itself', or - in one sense 
- whether it always satisfies the requirements of a Model Litigant. 
98 Inspector- General Report, above, incorporating the A TO responses to Key Findings. 
99 Subsidiary recommendations 4.1,4.2. 
100 PS LA 2007112, "Conduct of Tax Litigation in Courts and Tribunals" (Issued and effective from 21 June 
2007). 
101 Judiciary Act J 903 (Cth), ss 55ZG (2). 55ZH (1) (3) - see Lee, above, 13-14. 
1m Lee, above, 14. 
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The overriding problem is that to a number of practitioners, the ATO appears to act 
inappropriately at times - as in Indooroopilly. That is, whatever the reality, there are 
clear perceptions among a significant group of tax professionals (and some members of 
the Bench) that the ATO acts at times in a high-handed manner which seems at odds with 
its public interest duty. This may reflect no more than excessive zeal by the ATO to 
protect the revenue and the community (as the ATO interprets these concepts), but it 
creates significant potential problems for the tax system. 
Thus, even if the ATO's approach of not following decisions of single Federal Court 
judges in certain circumstances is technically correct, the way it has been handled over 
the past several years seems to have created a very negative perception, and sits uneasily 
with the ATO's obligations as a Model Litigant. 
It is essential that these perceptions of the ATO (particularly among practitioners) be 
changed positively, in order to restore the confidence of the tax profession and the public 
in the AT0 103 . 
This may simply reqUIre better communication, allied to a commitment to test all 
contentious points at the earliest reasonable point, rather than waiting for the "perfect 
wave". After all, presumably the court will interpret the law correctly whether or not the 
ATO believes that a particular fact situation is the most favourable possible to its 
argument. Delay in seeking clarification invites criticism by the community and by 
senior judges and imposes significant uncertainty and compliance costs on taxpayers and 
their advisers. 
103 It is important not to over-estimate the damage caused by incidents such as lndooroopilly on the 
relationship between the A TO and its constituencies - according to A TO surveys, in 2006 some 73% of 
community respondents felt that overall, the A TO was doing a good job, while tax agent satisfaction with 
ATO services has also been high (though dipping a little in 2006): Commissioner of Taxation, Annual 
Report 2005-06 above, 47-48 and 49-50 respectively. 
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This is a serIOUS Issue, because if the profession or the public lose faith in the 
transparency or integrity of the ATO or its practices, the current high levels of voluntary 
compliance may be imperiled. In turn, without widespread voluntary compliance, the 
effective operation ofthe overall tax system would be put at risk. 
This Paper has considered possible approaches to remedying the current procedural 
problems. 
It has been suggested that there is an arguable case for courts to provide declaratory 
remedies under the current statutory framework in situations such as Indooroopilly -, 
though on the case-law to date there appear to be significant barriers to the making of 
such offers in the tax context. 
Perhaps the point needs to be tested directly. Then, if relief under provisions such as ss 
21 and 39B is held not to be available to taxpayers in circumstances such as 
Indooroopilly, legislative amendment could be provided to expressly enable the taxpayer 
or Commissioner to seek declaratory or similar orders in limited circumstances104 - such 
as those in Indooroopilly or perhaps Young - before an assessment or fonnal dispute 
arises thus saving considerable time, effort and expense. 
It would be necessary to limit any such amendment appropriately, to avoid the 
declaratory remedy effectively replacing the Part IVC statutory review and appeal 
process otiose, but this could be achieved by defining the scope or timing of such relief. 
Alternatively, the ATO could be required to ensure that it acts more quickly in future to 
clarifY the law. This might be achieved through more rigorous enforcement by the 
Attorney-General of the Model Litigant guidelines or by exposing the ATO to litigious or 
104 See note 99 above. 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - AL TA 
2007 Refereed Conference Papers 
monetary "penalty" if it fails to do so. As a less desirable and more difficult option, 
perhaps there could be provision for a limited preliminary trial on the questions oflaw lO5 . 
However, the fundamental point is that the perception of unfairness in the ATO's 
approach to litigation must be seen to improve. The ATO needs to be - and be perceived 
to be - acting as a Model Litigant in all circumstances. It must be beyond reproach. 
The ATO's new Practice Statement PS LA 2007112 106 is a good start, but the ATO must 
live up to its role as a "model litigant" even in the heat of battle, and not act in ways that 
create or continue a perception - regardless of the reality - that it believes it is a "law unto 
itself' . 
Time will tell. 
105 Lee, above. 
106 PS LA 2007112, above, see especially paras 2-4. 
